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ABSTRACT 
It has been suggested that actors co-represent a shared task context when they perform 
a task in a joint fashion. The present study examined the possibility of co-representation in 
joint task-switching, in which two actors shared two tasks that switched randomly across 
trials. Experiment 1 showed that when an actor performed the tasks individually, switch costs 
were obtained if the actors responded on the previous trial (go trial) but not if they did not 
respond (nogo trial). When two actors performed the tasks jointly, switch costs were obtained 
if the actor responded on the previous trial (actor repeat trials) but not if the co-actor 
responded (actor switch trials). In Experiment 2, a single actor performed both tasks of the 
joint condition to test whether the findings of Experiment 1 were due to the use of different 
response sets by the two actors. Switch costs were obtained for both repetitions and 
alternations of the response set, which rules out this possibility. Taken together, our findings 
provided little support for the idea that actors co-represent the task sets of their co-actors. 
 
Keywords: Joint performance; co-representation; task switching; go/nogo task; task 
representation.  
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 There are numerous occasions in everyday activities for which two or more 
individuals need to perform a task cooperatively to achieve a common goal. In such 
situations, the labor required to perform the shared task must be divided between co-acting 
individuals. For instance, a person may drive a car while another navigates the driver in an 
unfamiliar neighborhood. The driver is concerned with the operations of the vehicle and the 
traffic condition, whereas the navigator is concerned with the current location of the vehicle 
and the selection of the correct route to the destination.  Given that each actor possesses only 
an incomplete picture of the whole task context, how can they achieve a common goal that 
requires information from both actors? Traditional approaches suggest that the actions of one 
actor can become stimuli to trigger the actions of the other, and vice versa, until the shared 
goal is achieved. However, a recent approach has suggested a more far-reaching possibility 
that co-actors do not only represent the shared goal but also co-represent the entire task that 
include both the actor’s own context and the co-actor’s context (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 
2003; Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). By doing so, each co-actor would represent a 
given task in the same fashion, which implies that each co-actor would represent the task-
related stimulus-response mappings not only for his or her own part of the task but also for 
the part of the co-acting other’s. 
 Previous research has provided evidence for the assumption that jointly performing a 
task leads to the representation of at least some aspects of a co-actor’s contributions to the 
task. The most systematic findings pertaining to this issue have been obtained by means of 
the joint Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003). In a standard, individual Simon task, participants 
press a left or right key in response to non-spatial features of a stimulus that is presented 
randomly to the left or right of some reference point (e.g., the fixation mark on the monitor). 
Even though stimulus location is irrelevant to selecting the correct responses, responses are 
faster and more accurate if the stimulus location coincides with the response location than if 
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it does not, which is termed the Simon effect (Lu & Proctor, 1995; Yamaguchi & Proctor, 
2012). In the joint version of the task, the two responses are divided among two co-acting 
participants, such that one actor responds to one of the relevant stimulus features (e.g., red 
stimuli) and the other actor responds to the other stimulus features (green stimuli). Note that 
this renders the task essentially a go/nogo task, which does not yield a Simon effect in the 
absence of a co-actor (Hommel, 1996). In the presence of a co-actor who operates the other 
key, a reliable Simon effect is observed (Sebanz et al., 2003), which is thus termed the joint 
Simon effect. Given that the Simon effect is attributed to response-selection processes (Lu & 
Proctor, 1995; Hommel, 2011), the joint Simon effect demonstrates that participants take into 
consideration the active contributions of their co-actor when selecting their responses. 
Research has begun to determine in more detail which aspects of the co-actor’s 
contributions to the task are considered in the process of response selection. Earlier 
approaches assumed that the impact of the co-actor’s contributions on response selection is 
automatic (Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005) and only occurs with human co-actors (e.g., Tsai, Kuo, 
Hung & Tzeng, 2008), which has been taken to demonstrate the “social nature of perception 
and action” (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). More recent studies have shown that the joint Simon 
effect is sensitive to the relationship between the two co-actors, so that its presence or size 
depends on whether this relationship is positive or negative (Hommel, Colzato & van den 
Wildenberg, 2009), competitive or cooperative (Ruys & Aarts, 2010), or more or less 
empathic (Ford & Aberdein, 2015), and whether the co-actors are perceived to belong to the 
same social group (Aquino et al., 2015; Constantini & Ferri, 2013; Iani et al., 2011; 
McClung, Jentzsch & Reicher, 2013). These observations suggest that the joint Simon effect 
relies on particular social factors, although they do not necessarily support a strong claim that 
all perception-action processes are inevitably social in nature (see Dolk et al, 2014, for a 
review).  Moreover, a reliable joint Simon effect is obtained not only with human or 
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anthropomorphized non-human co-actors (Müller et al., 2011) but also with a salient 
inanimate object such as Japanese waving cat or a ticking metronome that is presented in the 
place of a co-actor (Dolk et al., 2011).  
Although these findings do not warrant a strong claim that co-actors fully share their 
entire task experience, the findings would arguably allow for a more parsimonious 
interpretation of task sharing that an actor represents the actions of, or even the stimulus-
response relationships followed by, a co-actor. It is possible that participants represent not 
only the stimuli that they need to respond to (which in some sense already implies some 
knowledge about the stimuli they need to ignore) and the responses that they need to carry 
out but also the activities that their co-actor carries out. This might be because it allows the 
better monitoring of turn-taking in a joint task (Liefooghe, 2016; Wenke et al., 2011) or 
because the presence of another event, such as the co-actor’s activities, reintroduces an event 
representation against which the instructed event (one’s own action) needs to be selected 
(Dolk et al., 2014). It is even possible that people represent the associations between stimuli 
and responses for both one’s own and the other’s actions, as this would allow one to predict 
actions from stimuli. Such associations are commonly assumed to constitute the basis of task 
sets, which would suggest that people do represent at least the basic ingredients of the task set 
of a co-actor (Knoblich et al., 2011).  
The present study aimed to disentangle these two possibilities by means of a joint 
task-switching setting. In regular, individual task-switching settings, participants alternate 
between two or more tasks that differ with respect to the assignment of responses to stimuli. 
Responses are commonly faster if the task on the current trial is the same as the preceding 
trial (repeat trial) than if it is different (switch trial)—the so-called switch cost (for reviews, 
see Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). Switch costs are 
likely to reflect a larger number of processes, including the extra time needed to reconfigure 
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the task set on switch trials (Meiran, 1996), interference from no longer relevant but still 
lingering previous task sets (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994), priming in case of a repeated 
task cue (Logan & Bundesen, 2003), and the residual switch costs that remain even after a 
long preparation time (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Consider how switch costs might be 
affected by having tasks being shared by two co-actors. The most obvious prediction from a 
shared-task-set account (Knoblich et al., 2011) would be that switch costs should be the same 
irrespective of whether the previous trial was carried out by the participant or a co-actor. 
Previous studies do not provide unequivocal evidence for this possibility. 
To date, three studies have looked into joint task-switching (Dudarev & Hassin, 2016; 
Liefooghe, 2016; Wenke et al., 2011). Two of these studies had two actors perform two 
different tasks with the relevant actor being cued randomly from trial to trial (Dudarev & 
Hassin, 2016; Liefooghe, 2016). Whereas this design implies confounding between task-
switching and turn-taking (i.e., switching the actor implied switching the task, and vice 
versa), the idea was that switch trials should produce worse performance than repeat trials 
only if the participant actively represents the co-actor’s task.  Thus, the presence of switch 
costs after co-actor’s trials would indicate shared task representations. Dudarev and Hassin 
(2016) obtained significant switch costs in such a joint condition but not in a control 
condition for which individual participants carried out the same go/nogo task without a co-
actor. The researchers also found no switch costs in another control condition for which both 
actors worked on the same task.  The results were taken to argue against the possibility that 
turn-taking itself could have been responsible for the measured switch costs. Unfortunately, 
however, the same-task versus different-task manipulation was carried out between groups, 
which might have affected the representation of the other agent. A co-actor who performs the 
same task as oneself may be perceived as more similar to oneself (Hommel et al., 2009) than 
a co-actor who performs a different task. Perceived self-other similarity has been 
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demonstrated to facilitate “feature migration” between self and other (Ma, Sellaro, Lippelt & 
Hommel, 2016), in the sense that features that actually relate to the other are perceived as part 
of oneself.  Thus, it may be that switching is more demanding between actors that are 
perceived to be more different, producing switch costs in the different task conditions but not 
in the same task condition. This explanation would not require the assumption of task-
sharing. It may also be that participants monitor the stimulus-response contingencies of the 
co-actor’s trials (Liefooghe, 2016), which would necessarily lead to more violations of the 
rules the participant is storing for his or her own performance if the co-actor’s task is 
different, especially when the same stimuli are mapped to different responses for two co-
actors (as was the case in Dudarev and Hassin’s study). Such violations might have increased 
the dissimilarities between the co-actors, making it more difficult to perform the task after the 
co-actor’s trial. 
A very similar study was carried out by Liefooghe (2016), who also had co-actors 
carry out different tasks. The study aimed to separate three different components of switch 
costs: (a) the efficiency of task preparation, as measured by the reduction of switch costs if 
more preparation time is available; (b) the interference from the previous task set, as 
measured by the reduction of switch costs if the interval between the previous response and 
the next task cue increases; and (c) the residual switch costs that remain after the longest 
preparation time. Interestingly, neither task preparation nor interference from the previous 
task was sensitive to task/actor switches, which according to the author rules out that 
participants truly represented the co-actor’s task set. In contrast, residual switch costs were 
increased with task/actor switches, an effect that Liefooghe attributed to the requirement to 
identify the relevant actor in this condition. This interpretation would also account for the 
findings of Dudarev and Hassin (2016), as would the aforementioned possibility that 
exposure to different stimulus-response contingencies increases cognitive conflict. 
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Whereas the studies of Dudarev and Hassin (2016) and of Liefooghe (2016) can be 
taken to investigate the effects of actor switching, Wenke et al. (2011, Experiment 2) discuss 
an unpublished study that assessed the impact of task switching more directly. This study 
sought to separate the effects of actor switching in task switching by having two actors 
perform the same two tasks (e.g., color discrimination and shape discrimination). A task and 
an actor were randomly cued on each trial, so that only one actor performed on a given trial, 
just as in the studies of Dudarev and Hassin (2016) and Liefooghe (2016). This joint go/nogo 
(i.e., actor no-switch and switch) condition was compared to an individual go/nogo condition, 
in which a single actor performed the same task with the actor cue serving a go/nogo cue (i.e., 
‘respond’ vs. ‘not respond’). There were switch costs after go trials and no switch costs after 
nogo trials in the individual condition, which replicated a standard observation (e.g., Schuch 
& Koch, 2003). The crucial question was whether the same pattern could be observed in the 
joint condition. If the actor repeats (i.e., in go trials), one would expect standard switch costs, 
as the participant would need to reconfigure his or her own cognitive system. More 
diagnostic data came from the actor-switch trials, as these followed nogo trials. If participants 
represent the co-actor’s task set just like their own (Knoblich et al., 2011), one would expect 
switch costs of the same size as in trials following go trials, so that switching costs should be 
independent from actor switch. If they do not represent the co-actor’s task set, however, one 
would expect no switch costs just as in the individual condition. Wenke et al. (2011) report 
that the same pattern was found in individual and joint conditions, with significant switch 
costs for actor repetitions but not for actor switches.  
While this would arguably be rather strong evidence against the shared representation 
of task sets, the respective study has not yet been published and the brief description 
presented in Wenke et al.’s (2011) review article does not allow for strong and far-reaching 
claims. To test whether the necessary evidence could be provided, Experiment 1 of the 
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present study conceptually replicated and extended the experiments discussed by Wenke and 
colleagues, which allowed us to avoid the problems associated with the two actor-switching 
studies of Dudarev and Hassin (2016) and Liefooghe (2016).  Note that in Experiment 1 actor 
switching was de-confounded from task switching but was still confounded with switching of 
response set because two co-actors used different sets of response keys.  Experiment 2 
examined the effect of switching response sets on task switch costs by having a single 
participant perform both tasks of the joint condition by using the two response sets that were 
assigned to two co-actors in Experiment 1.  If the same task set is used to perform the same 
task with different response sets, switch costs should be obtained regardless of whether 
response set is switched.  Such outcomes would reinforce the interpretation of Experiment 1, 
especially if switch costs are found to depend on actor switching. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1, pairs of individuals performed a cued task-switching paradigm, in 
which a task cue unpredictably signaled one of two tasks (color or shape task) on each trial. 
The actors used two different sets of two response keys each to respond to the target stimuli. 
In the joint condition, one of the actors was also cued at target onset, and only the cued actor 
responded while the other did not perform. In the individual condition, the procedure was 
identical, except that one of the actors did not perform throughout an entire block, so no one 
responded on trials for which the active actor was not cued. It was expected that in the 
individual condition, switch costs should be obtained on trials that followed go trials but not 
on trials that followed nogo trials (Schuch & Koch, 2003). If task sets are co-represented by 
the co-acting participants in the joint condition, there should be switch costs on trials that 
followed the co-actor’s trial as well as on trials that followed the actor’s own trial. If not, the 
outcome should be comparable for joint and individual conditions, with switch costs being 
present in trials following go trials but not in trials following nogo trials. 
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Note that Wenke et al.’s conclusion relied on the null effect including only 16 
participants in each of the two versions of the experiment. We used a larger sample size (N = 
56) to increase statistical power1 so that small effects could be detected. Moreover, none of 
the previous studies included multiple task cues for each task, so the contribution of cue 
priming was not dissociated from that of task switching (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). By 
including multiple task cues, we could examine whether the actors pay attention to some 
aspects of the co-actor’s task context if not to the entire context, as recently suggested in a 
different joint task setting (Janczyk, Welsh, & Dolk, 2016). Thus, we included three types of 
transitions, cue repeat trial (both the task cue and the task repeated), cue switch trial (the task 
cue switched but the task repeated), and task switch trial (both the task cue and the task 
switched). Each transition occurred in one third of the trials.  The difference between cue 
repeat and cue switch trials reflected a cue switch cost, and the difference between cue switch 
and task switch trials reflected a task switch cost. We expected no task switch cost on trials 
following no-go trials in the individual and joint conditions, as in Wenke et al.’s report.  It 
was still possible to obtain cue switch costs in the joint condition because the task cue 
appeared before the actor cue, so both actors would have to encode the task cue on every 
trial. If so, the encoded task cue would remain in short-term memory and facilitate cue 
encoding on the next trial (Logan & Bundesen, 2003), facilitating responding when the same 
task cue repeats. 
Method 
Participants 
                                                 
1 We computed post-hoc power for the experiments reported by Wenke et al. (2011), assuming a small effect 
size (Cohen’s f = .15) with a 2 (Task Transition: repeat vs. switch) x 2 (Condition: joint vs. individual) x 2 
(Previous Trial: go vs. nogo) repeated-measures design at the alpha level of .05, which resulted in the power of 
.340. With the sample size of 56, the estimated power increased to .925 and with the 3 x 2 x 2 design that we 
actually used in Experiment 1, it went up to .979.  
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 Fifty six undergraduate students at Edge Hill University participated in the present 
study (49 females, 7 males; mean age = 18.79, SD = 1.41, range = 18-24). They were 
recruited from an introductory psychology module and received experimental credits toward 
the module or paid £3 for participation. All reported having normal color vision and normal 
or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. They were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus consisted of a personal computer and a 23-in widescreen monitor. 
Stimuli were green and red squares (4.8 cm in side) and diamonds (the squares tilted 45°), 
which appeared at the center of the screen. The task cues were “COLOUR” and “HUE” for 
the color task, and “SHAPE” and “FORM” for the shape task. The task cues were presented 
in the Courier New font at 36-pt. They appeared 6.8 cm above the screen center. The actor 
cue was the letter “A” (to indicate the actor on the left) and “B” (to indicate the actor on the 
right). The cue was superimposed on diamonds and squares, in the Arial font at 40-pt in 
white; as the background was also white, it appears as if there was a letter-shaped hole in the 
stimulus. Responses were registered by pressing keys on a QWERTY desktop keyboard.  
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in two computer labs with 24 seats arranged in four 
rows of six computers each. The distance between two adjacent computers was about 160 cm. 
There were at most three pairs in each row; each pair of participants were seated in front of a 
computer monitor and at every other computer to avoid cluttering between pairs. Participants 
from different seminar groups were assigned to pairs randomly by the experimenter. Each 
pair of participants read on-screen instructions, which emphasized both speed and accuracy 
of responding. Participants who sat on the left side placed their left and right index fingers on 
the ‘z’ and ‘c’ keys, respectively; those who sat on the right side placed their left and right 
index fingers on the ‘1’ and ‘3’ keys on the numerical keypad on the right side of the 
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keyboard. For both participants, the ‘z’ and ‘1’ keys were called the left response, and the ‘c’ 
and ‘3’ keys were called the right response. Each participant was instructed to press the left 
key to one color and the right key to the other color for the color task, and the left key to one 
shape and the right key to the other shape for the shape task; the mappings between the keys 
and the colors and shapes were randomly determined for each pair. 
Each participant performed two joint blocks, for which one participant responded to a 
subset of stimuli and another participant responded to another subset of stimuli, and one 
individual block, for which one participant responded to stimuli and another participant 
remained silent. Thus, there were two joint blocks and two individual blocks for each pair. 
Each block consisted of 120 test trials, and there was a block of 16 practice trials before the 
first joint blocks and before each of the two individual blocks (one for each actor). For some 
pairs, two joint blocks were administered first and then two individual blocks; for other pairs, 
two individual blocks were administered first and then two joint blocks. The order of the joint 
and individual blocks were determined randomly for each pair. Within the individual blocks, 
the order of the actor performing the block was also determined randomly.  
In the joint block, each trial started with a task cue that stayed on the screen for 450 
ms, followed by a 50-ms blank screen. The imperative stimulus (colored square or diamond) 
appeared for 2,000 ms or until a response was made, along with the actor cue that was 
superimposed on the imperative stimulus. If the correct response was made, a blank display 
replaced the stimulus and lasted for 1,000 ms; otherwise, an error message was presented for 
1,000 ms. The message was “Error!” for an incorrect response and “Faster!” for no response. 
If a wrong actor responded, the message was “Not your turn!” The next trial started with 
another task cue. Response time (RT) was measured as the interval between onset of the 
imperative stimulus and a depression of a response key. 
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The individual block was essentially the same, but participants were required to 
respond only when the actor cue indicated their trials (go trials) but withhold responding 
when the actor cue indicated their co-actor’s trials (nogo trials). If no response was made on a 
go trial, the error message was “Respond!” If a response was made on a nogo trial, the error 
message was “Don’t respond!” There was a 2,000-ms window to respond on each trial.   
Design 
 The experiment involved two conditions, joint and individual conditions, which 
defined the factor Task Condition. Both conditions consisted of three types of task sequences 
(cue-repeat, cue-switch, and task-switch), which defined the factor Trial Sequence.  Cue-
repeat referred to the condition for which the same task cue occurred on two successive trials 
(e.g., “SHAPE” on trial N, and “SHAPE” again on trial N+1); cue-switch referred to the 
condition for which the two different task cues assigned to the same task occurred on two 
successive trials (e.g., “SHAPE” on trial N, and “FORM” on trial N+1); and task-switch 
referred to the condition for which two different task cues assigned to different tasks occurred 
on two successive trials (e.g., “SHAPE” on trial N, and “HUE” on trial N+1).  Trials were 
determined randomly on each trial, so there was an equal probability of 33% for each 
sequence type. In the individual condition, previous trials could be go or nogo trials; in the 
joint condition, previous trials could be performed by the same actor as the current trial (actor 
repeat) or by a different actor (actor switch).  The factor Previous Trial was defined as to 
whether the same actor responded to stimuli on the previous trial (go trials in the individual 
condition and actor repeat trials in the joint condition) or did not (nogo trials in the individual 
condition and actor switch trials in the joint condition).  Previous Trial and Trial Sequence 
were manipulated orthogonally. 
Results 
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 Trials were excluded from analyses if RT was less than 200 ms, if no response was 
made within the 2,000-ms window, or if a wrong actor responded (4.44% of all trials).  
Among the remaining trials, the overall error rate was (25.31%), which is higher than typical 
task-switching experiments with single actors. This is reasonable given the complexity of the 
task.  Also, participants did not receive extensive practice with the task before the test trials, 
which might have contributed to increasing the overall error rates. Due to the high error rates, 
trials that followed an error trial were not excluded to retain as many trials as possible (the 
data were also analyzed after excluding trials following an error trial, but the results are 
consistent with those reported below). One female participant was excluded from the analysis 
due to an empty case in one of the conditions. Mean RTs and percentages of error trials (PE) 
were computed for each participant and were submitted to 2 (Task Condition: joint vs. 
individual) x 3 (Trial Sequence: task-switch vs. cue-switch vs. cue-repeat) x 2 (Previous 
Trial) ANOVAs. All factors were within-subject variables. The ANOVA results are 
summarized in Table 1. RT and PE are shown in Figure 1. 
Mean Response Times 
 Responses were generally faster for the joint condition (M = 788 ms) than for the 
individual condition (M = 833 ms), as indicated by a significant main effect of Task 
Condition. A significant main effect of Previous Trial revealed that responses were also faster 
if the previous trial was a go trial (M = 795 ms) or the actor’s own trial (M = 753 ms) than if 
the previous trial was a nogo trial (M = 872 ms) or the co-actor’s trial (M = 823 ms). A main 
effect of Trial Sequence was also significant, and the factor interacted with Previous Trial. 
Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni adjusted2) compared RTs for cue-repeat, cue-switch, and task-
switch trials to clarify the interaction. When the same actor responded on the previous trial, 
                                                 
2 To implement the Bonferroni correction, p-values were multiplied by the number of pairwise t-tests, which is 
equivalent to dividing the criterion p-value (α) by the number of pairwise t-tests.   
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RT was shorter for cue-repeat trials (M = 732 ms) than for cue-switch trials (M = 784 ms, p = 
.004) and for task-switch trials (M = 806 ms, p < .001), whereas the latter two did not difer (p 
= .390).  However, when the same actor did not respond on the previous trial (i.e., when the 
previous trial was nogo in the individual condition or when it was the co-actor’s trial in the 
joint condition), no switch costs emerged (Ms = 852 ms for cue-repeat, 843 ms for cue-
switch, and 847 ms for task-switch; all p = 1).   
Although the 3-way interaction among Previous Trial, Trial Transition, and Task 
Condition, was far from significant, we also compared the three trial types in terms of 
previous trial separately for the individual and joint conditions for clarity. In the individual 
condition, when the previous trial was a go trial, RT was shorter for cue-repeat trials (M = 
742 ms) than for cue-switch trials (M = 819 ms; p = .038) and for task-switch trials (M = 823 
ms; p = .002), whereas the latter did not differ (p = 1). When the previous trial was a nogo 
trial, there were no differences among the three trial sequences (Ms = 883 ms, 857, ms, 876 
ms, for cue-repeat, cue-switch, and task-switch trials; all ps = 1).  In the joint condition, when 
the previous trial was the actor’s own trial, RT was shorter for cue-repeat trials (M = 722 ms) 
than task-switch trials (M = 788 ms; p < .001), and tended to be shorter for cue-repeat trials 
than for cue-switch trials (M = 749 ms; p = .073) and for cue-switch trials than for task-
switch trials (p = .071). Most importantly, when the previous trial was the co-actor’s trial, RT 
did not differ for these trials (Ms = 821 ms, 830 ms, and 818 ms, for cue-repeat, cue-switch, 
and task-switch trials, respectively; all ps = 1). 
Percentages of Error Trials 
 The PE results were consistent with the RT results, except that a main effect of Task 
Condition was not significant.  A significant main effect of Previous Trial revealed that PE 
was smaller when the same actor responded on the previous trial (M = 23.73%) than when the 
actor did not respond (M = 27.60%).  Trial Sequence produced a main effect, and it also 
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interacted with Previous Trial. When the same actor responded on the previous trial, task-
switch produced a larger PE (M = 30.40%, p < .001) than did cue-repeat (M = 20.16%, p < 
.001) or cue-switch (M = 20.64%), whereas the latter two did not differ (p = 1).  When the 
actor did not respond on the previous trial, there were no difference among the three 
transitions (Ms = 26.72% for cue-repeat, 27.00% for cue-switch, and 29.08% for task-switch; 
all ps > .4).  As in RT, Task Condition did not modulate these outcomes. 
Discussion 
 As expected, switch costs were obtained in the individual condition when the 
preceding trial was a go trial but not when it was a nogo trial. Importantly, switch costs were 
also obtained in the joint condition when the preceding trail was the actor’s own trial (actor 
repeat) but not when it was the co-actor’s trial (actor switch). Note that go/nogo signals 
appeared with the target after the presentation of a task-cue, so task preparation would have 
occurred on each trial, but response selection might have been restricted to go trials (Schuch 
& Koch, 2003). This is consistent with the assumption that the actors in the present 
experiment did not select a response on their co-actors’ trials as if these trials were their own 
(Wenke et al., 2011), which is not consistent with the idea that the task set of the co-actor was 
co-represented (Knoblich et al., 2011). Furthermore, the inclusion of multiple task cues for 
each task did not show any evidence that task cue priming facilitated responding after nogo 
or the co-actor’s trials. This is an interesting outcome. Cue repetition is thought to allow the 
actors to retain the previous task cue in short-term memory and facilitate cue encoding on the 
current trial (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). The task cue appeared before the actor cue in the 
present experiment, so the actors would need to encode the task cue on every trial. The lack 
of cue switch costs after nogo trials indicates that the encoded task cue was discarded from 
short-term memory during the co-actor’s trial. One possibility is that the representation of the 
given task cue was bound to either one’s own nogo reaction (cf., Kühn & Brass, 2010) or to 
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the other agent. Repeating a cue could then have retrieved this (now misleading) binding, 
which would be expected to create conflict (Hommel, 2004) and might have counteracted 
possible priming benefits. In any case, this effect does not support co-representation of co-
actor’s task sets either. 
 It is also interesting to note that participants made relatively fewer errors to interpret 
the actor cue (< 5%) and the majority of errors was due to misapplications of wrong stimulus-
response mappings (~25%).  These outcomes may reflect a hierarchical structure of cognitive 
processes, whereby participants first determined whose turn it was, and subsequently selected 
an appropriate response to the target. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Although the outcome of Experiment 1 is consistent with those of the study discussed 
in Wenke et al.’s (2011) review, one may wonder how the obtained switch costs compare to 
standard switch costs obtained when a single actor performs the same task condition without 
a co-actor.  We call this a full-task condition, following Liefooghe (2016) who also compared 
actor switching with standard individual task switching.  Testing a full-task condition is 
important because a lack of switch costs in the joint condition of Experiment 1 can be taken 
as evidence against a strong shared task sets, only if switch costs could be obtained in the 
full-task condition.  This is because of the possibility that assigning different tasks to 
different hands or response sets facilitates the cognitive separation and discrimination 
between the two tasks, which in turn might reduce or eliminate task switch costs (Jersild, 
1927). Only if this possibility can be excluded we can confidently conclude that the outcome 
of Experiment 1 provides unequivocal evidence against task-set sharing in this task setting. 
Therefore, in Experiment 2, we went on to test whether switch costs are obtained in a full-
task condition: a single actor used the two response sets that were distributed between two 
actors in the joint condition of Experiment 1, with one hand operating one response set and 
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the other hand operating the other response set. The actor cue used in Experiment 1 was used 
to cue a response set (i.e., hand) to be used on a given trial. Because a single actor 
represented both task contexts, we expected that switch costs should be obtained regardless of 
whether response set was switched across successive trials.  
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty six participants were recruited from the Edge Hill University community (19 
females, 7 males; mean age = 21.73, SD = 6.57, range=18-50). They received experimental 
credits toward the module or paid £3 for participation. All reported having normal color 
vision and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. They were naïve as to the purpose of 
the experiment.  
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
 The apparatus and stimuli were identical with those used in Experiment 1. The only 
difference was that participants performed all trials alone without a co-actor. The experiment 
was also conducted individually in a smaller experimental room.  Participants placed their left 
middle and index fingers on the ‘z’ and ‘c’ keys and their right index and middle fingers on 
the ‘1’ and ‘3’ keys on the numeric keypad, respectively. The letter that appeared within the 
target stimulus cued which hand to use, such that “A” indicated the left hand and “B” 
indicated the right hand.  
Each participant performed two blocks of the go/nogo condition and two blocks of the 
full-task blocks. The go/nogo condition was exactly the same as the individual condition in 
Experiment 1, except that there was no co-actor sitting next to them; participants always used 
the left hand in one block and the right hand in the other block. The full-task condition was 
the same as the joint condition in Experiment 1, except that the actor cue now cued the hand 
to be used on each trial (“A” indicated the left hand, and “B” indicated the right hand). Two 
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blocks were identical for the full-task condition. The present experiment followed closely the 
procedure of Experiment 1 in other respects. 
Design 
 The experiment involved two conditions, full-task and go/nogo conditions, which 
were analogous to the joint and individual conditions in Experiment 1, respectively, and 
defined the factor Task Condition. Both conditions consisted of three types of task sequences 
(cue-repeat, cue-switch, and task-switch), which defined the factor Trial Sequence. In the 
go/nogo condition, previous trials could be a go or nogo trial; in the full-task condition, 
previous trials could be performed with the same hand as the current trial (hand repeat) or by 
a different hand (hand switch). The factor Previous Trial was defined as to whether 
participants used the same hand to respond to stimuli on the previous trial (go trials in the 
go/nogo condition and hand repeat trials in the full-task condition) or they did not (nogo trials 
in the go/nogo condition and hand switch trials in the full-task condition).  
Results 
 Trials were excluded in the same manner as in Experiment 1 (4.18% of all trials). As 
in Experiment 1, the overall error rate was high (33.55%). Trials that followed an error trial 
were excluded in the analysis, but the results were consistent when those trials were included. 
RT and PE were computed for each participant and submitted to 2 (Task Condition: full-task 
vs. go/nogo) x 3 (Trial Sequence: task-switch vs. cue-switch vs. cue-repeat) x 2 (Previous 
Trial) ANOVAs. The ANOVA results are summarized in Table 2.  RT and PE are shown in 
Figure 2. 
Mean Response Times 
 The significant main effect of Previous Trial revealed that responses were faster when 
participants used the same response set on the previous trial (Ms = 843 ms and 841 ms for the 
go/nogo and full-task conditions, respectively) than when they did not (Ms = 945 ms and 921 
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ms for the go/nogo and full-task conditions, respectively). Responses also depended on Task 
Sequence, but this effect was modulated by Previous Trial and Task Condition. To clarify the 
3-way interaction, the effect of Task Sequence was analyzed separately for the full-task 
condition and the go/nogo condition. Multiple comparisons were Bonferroni-corrected.  
For the full-task condition, RT was slower for task-switch trials (M = 902 ms) than for 
cue-switch trials (M = 827 ms; p = .001) or for cue-repeat trials (M = 793 ms; p < .001) when 
the previous trial was performed by the same hand, analogous to actor-repeat trials in the 
joint condition of Experiment 1; there were no difference between cue-repeat and cue-switch 
trials (p = .109). When the previous trial was performed by the different hand, RT was still 
longer for task-switch trials (M = 964 ms) than for cue-switch trials (M = 901 ms; p = .003) 
or cue-repeat trials (M = 897 ms; p = .004); there were no difference between cue-repeat and 
cue-switch trials (p = 1).  
For the go/nogo condition, RT was longer for task-switch trials (M = 909 ms) than for 
cue-switch trials (M = 832 ms; p = .001) or cue-repeat trials (M = 789 ms; p < .001) when the 
previous trial was a go trial; there was no difference between the latter two (p = .225). When 
the previous trial was a nogo trial, no difference emerged among task-switch (M = 943 ms), 
cue-switch (M = 947 ms), and cue-repeat (M = 947 ms; all ps = 1). These outcomes are 
consistent with the individual condition of Experiment 1.  
Percentages of Error Trials 
 As in Experiment 1, the PE results were generally consistent with the RT data.  A 
significant main effect of Previous Trial revealed that PE was lower when the previous trial 
required the same hand response or when it was a go trial (M = 22.76%) than when the 
previous trial required a different hand or when it was a nogo trial (M = 26.81%).  Trial 
Sequence produced a main effect and interacted with Previous Trial.  More importantly, the 
significant 3-way interaction among Trial Sequence, Previous Trial, and Task Condition, 
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indicated that switch costs depended on the previous trial type but differently for the full-task 
and go/nogo conditions.  To disentangle this interaction, post-hoc tests (Bonferroni corrected) 
were carried out to examine the effect of Trial Sequence separately for the two task 
conditions. 
 In the full-task condition, task-switch produced a larger PE (M = 31.15%) than did 
cue-repeat (M = 26.41%, p = .039) and cue-switch (M = 25.23%, p = .046) when the previous 
trial required a different hand, whereas the latter two did not differ (p = 1).  Although the 
results were similar when the previous trial required the same hand, as task-switch (M = 
28.80%) produced larger PE than did cue-repeat (M = 22.86%) or cue-switch (M = 23.60%), 
the differences were only marginal (ps = .09 and .10, respectively).  Thus, switch costs were 
more pronounced when the hand switched across trials than when the same hand repeated.  In 
the go/nogo condition, task-switch produced a larger PE (M = 27.67%) than did cue-repeat 
(M = 15.30%, p = .016) and cue-switch (M = 15.30%, p = .001), whereas the latter two did 
not differ (p = .802) when the previous trial was a go trial.  When the previous trial was a 
nogo trial, there were no significant difference (Ms = 23.45% for cue-repeat, 27.52% for cue-
switch, and 27.09% for task-switch; all ps > .5).   
Discussion 
Switch costs were obtained in the go/nogo condition when previous trials were go 
trials but not when they were nogo trials, consistent with the individual condition of 
Experiment 1. In the full-task condition, switch costs were obtained in RT on hand-repeat 
trials for which participants used the same response set (analogous to actor-repeat trials) as 
well as on hand-switch trials for which participants used different response sets (analogous to 
actor-switch trials). The outcomes imply that the same task representation was used to 
perform trials even when response set differed between trials as long as the same actor 
performed both trials. In this experiment, a single actor integrated the two task contexts (i.e., 
22 
No Shared Task Representation in Joint Task Switching 
two response sets) into a single task representation that should be equivalent to co-
representation of the shared task contexts in the joint condition. Thus, the present results, and 
their difference with those in the joint condition of Experiment 1, suggest that the lack of 
switch costs in Experiment 1 was not due to the nature of the task condition (e.g., task 
complexity, task discrimination, or response-set discrimination).  Instead, these findings 
reinforce the conclusion that the lack of switch costs in the joint condition of Experiment 1 
implies a lack of task-set sharing.  Interestingly, there were no cue switch costs on hand-
switch trials, indicating that the lack of cue-switch costs in the joint condition of Experiment 
1 (which may represent the binding of cues to either one’s own no-reaction or to the other 
agent and/or his or her response) was not unique to joint performance. It may be that cue-
repeat trials still involved switches of the actor- or hand-cue, so they were not purely cue-
repeat trials as cue encoding continues until the actor- or hand-cue encoding is completed.     
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Approaches to joint performance agree in assuming that people take the activities of 
co-actors into account, but there is also evidence that the resulting representations do not 
capture all aspects of the joint performance. The present study sought to test whether people 
may represent not only the stimuli that co-actors are facing (so as to allow for turn-tasking; 
e.g., Wenke et al., 2011) and the actions that co-actors execute (so as to allow for self-other-
action discrimination; Dolk et al., 2014) but also entire task-sets that include stimulus-
response relationships relevant only for the co-actor (Knoblich et al., 2011). As we have 
argued, previous investigations of actor switching (Dudarev & Hassin, 2016; Liefooghe, 
2016) are not sufficiently diagnostic because they are open to interpretations that do not 
require the assumption of task-set sharing. A more telling design was discussed by Wenke et 
al. (2011, Experiment 2), which was taken from an unpublished study. We therefore adopted 
the basic design from this latter study, together with a manipulation of task-cue repetition 
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versus switch to determine whether the basic findings could be confirmed in a well-powered 
study. Experiment 1 shows that this was indeed the case: task-switch costs were obtained 
after go trials but not after nogo trials, irrespective of whether a co-actor performed during 
the actor’s nogo trials.  Experiment 2 showed that reliable task-switch costs are obtained if 
the same participant operated on the two response sets that were distributed across two 
participants in Experiment 1. This ruled out the possibility that the lack of reliable switch 
costs in Experiment 1 was due to the fact that the two actors use different response sets. 
Taken together, these findings question a strong claim of task-set sharing that “humans 
represent not only their own tasks but also those of their partners and even those of people 
who they do not need to coordinate with” (Knoblich et al., 2011, p. 83). 
 A possible counterargument could be derived from a recent discussion of the 
processes involved in nogo trials. The lack of switch costs after nogo trials is commonly 
thought to reflect the fact that task switching completes only after a response is selected and 
executed (Philipp, Jolicoeur, Falkenstein, & Koch, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 2003; also see 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995). On go trials, response-related processes complete the activation of 
the relevant task set, and the activation survives until the next trial where it can impair 
performance if a different task set is required to perform the trial. On nogo trials, however, 
response-related processes are not executed, so the activation of the relevant task set is not 
sufficiently strong to carry over to the next trial. This interpretation is consistent with the fact 
that the elimination of switch costs is associated with increases in RT on repeat trials rather 
than decreases on switch trials, indicating that repeat trials are performed as if they were 
switch trials. However, there is an alternative interpretation: the task set may be activated on 
go and on nogo trials alike, but is then suppressed to inhibit responses on nogo trials 
(Lenartowicz, Yeung, & Cohen, 2011; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Szmalec, & Vandierendonck, 
2005). Consistent with this inhibition account, switch costs are still observed on trials for 
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which only the task cue is presented but no target occurs (cue-only trials; Lenartowicz et al., 
2011; Swainson, Martin, & Prosser, 2016). Thus, one could argue that our participants did 
represent their co-actor’s task but suppressed the representation on nogo trials.  If so, switch 
costs could not be obtained on trials following nogo trials. 
 While this would be a valid possibility, the inhibition account faces numerous 
problems. For one, switch costs are still eliminated when the previous trial presents a neutral 
stimulus that is not assigned to any response (Astle, Jackson, & Swainson, 2006). No 
response or task set should be activated under such conditions, so it would not be plausible to 
inhibit one or the other. Also, it has been shown that switch costs are obtained when one of 
the alternative responses is inhibited selectively (Verbruggen, Leifooghe, & Vandierendonck, 
2006), suggesting that inhibition of a given response is not sufficient to inhibit the entire task 
set. Most importantly, a task-set-inhibition account would have predicted negative switch 
costs in our study, because the account predicts that cuing a co-actor to perform task A in a 
given nogo trial would lead the actor to activate and then suppress task set A.  This should 
make it particularly difficult for the actor to reactivate the just-suppressed task set A when the 
task is repeated (Mayr & Keele, 2000; Meuter, & Allport, 1999), which in turn should make 
repeat trials more demanding than switch trials. Our findings do not provide any support for 
this prediction. Thus, we conclude that participants did not represent anything more complex 
or comprehensive than the stimuli that a co-actor is facing and the actions that he or she 
performs in a joint condition. 
Finally, we should note that previous studies used different variations of joint task-
switching (Dudarev & Hassin, 2016; Liefooghe, 2016) and demonstrated switch costs after 
the co-actor’s trials.  These studies used a condition in which task switching always occurred 
with switching of the actors, whereas our method separated the two types of switching.  It 
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would be important for future studies to examine how the co-occurrences of actor switching 
and task switching contribute to task-switching costs in joint settings. 
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Table 1. ANOVA results in Experiment 1. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
  
Response Time 
Task Condition (TC) 
 
1, 54 80,193.05 4.29 .043 0.074 
Previous Trial (PT) 
 
1, 54 10,378.33 43.8 < .001 0.448 
Trial Sequence (TS) 
 
2, 108 12,456.51 5.28 .006 0.089 
TC x PT 
 
1, 54 9,779.98 < 1 .611 0.005 
TC x TS 
 
2, 108 12,255.84 < 1 .940 0.001 
PT x TS 
 
2, 108 8,840.93 10.58 < .001 0.164 
TC x PT x TS   2, 108 11,723.51 2.3 .105 0.041 
  
Percentage of Error Trials 
TC 
 
1, 54 548.72 < 1 .679 .003 
PT 
 
1, 54 109.30 22.60 < .001 .295 
TS 
 
2, 108 166.57 16.47 < .001 .234 
TC x PT 
 
1, 54 145.18 1.05 .310 .019 
TC x TS 
 
2, 108 117.26 < 1 .918 .002 
PT x TS 
 
2, 108 112.29 9.89 < .001 .155 
TC x PT x TS   2, 108 148.02 < 1 .504 .013 
Note: Bold represents a significant effect. 
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Table 2. ANOVA results in Experiment 2. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
  
Response Time 
Task Condition (TC) 
 
1, 25 81,374.85 < 1 .676 .007 
Previous Trial (PT) 
 
1, 25 14,310.02 45.39 < .001 .645 
Trial Sequence (TS) 
 
2, 50 6,751.92 21.72 < .001 .465 
TC x PT 
 
1, 25 7,016.36 1.35 .257 .051 
TC x TS 
 
2, 50 3,633.36 2.35 .106 .086 
PT x TS 
 
2, 50 4,929.93 8.97 < .001 .264 
TC x PT x TS   2, 50 3,397.35 3.68 .032 .128 
  
Percentage of Error Trials 
TC 
 
1, 25 420.34 1.80 .192 .067 
PT 
 
1, 25 150.26 8.52 .007 .254 
TS 
 
2, 50 94.58 12.51 < .001 .333 
TC x PT 
 
1, 25 100.21 1.84 .187 .069 
TC x TS 
 
2, 50 115.36 < 1 .925 .003 
PT x TS 
 
2, 50 67.34 3.55 .036 .124 
TC x PT x TS   2, 50 82.47 3.73 .031 .130 
Note: Bold represents a significant effect. 
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Figure 1. Mean response times (RT) and percentages of error trials (PE) for the joint 
condition (A) and the individual condition (B) as a function of trial sequence and the previous 
trial in Experiment 1 (error bars represent one standard errors of the mean). 
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Figure 2. Mean response times (RT) and percentages of error trials (PE) for the full-task 
condition (A) and the go/nogo condition (B) as a function of trial sequence and the previous 
trial in Experiment 2 (error bars represent one standard errors of the mean). 
 
